


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RESEARCH PAPER P-429

POLICYMAKING AND THE POWER STRUGGLE
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Harold C. Hinton

February 1968



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


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I

INTRODUCTION

Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution has dominated the political course of Communist China (the CPR, or Chinese People's Republic) since 1965. Accordingly, this Paper presents an analysis (necessarily tentative) of the Cultural Revolution, with emphasis on policymaking and the power struggle at the top of the political system. This analysis, if it is to be comprehensible, in turn requires a brief historical introduction. In conclusion, the Paper attempts to estimate the future course of Chinese policy and to suggest appropriate guidelines for the United States.

A. COMPROMISE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD (1958-1961)

The Great Leap Forward was launched in the second quarter of 1958 as the culmination of a series of major Maoist policy initiatives dating back about two years. Among its purposes were the intensive mobilization of the peasantry, a tactic long dear to Mao, as the best answer to the various shortcomings of the First Five Year Plan (1953-1957) and of the newly formed collective farms; and the preemption vis-a-vis the Soviet Union of an ideological march on the way to "Communism." The Leap was paralleled by a major external politico-military campaign launched in a relatively controllable area, the Taiwan Strait. This campaign appears to have been designed in part to create a favorable psychological backdrop for the Leap, the Soviet Union having failed to provide such a backdrop by a positive response to Mao's assertion in 1957 that "The East wind [the Communist bloc] has prevailed over the West wind [the West]." In addition, the Taiwan Strait crisis was evidently intended to dramatize the CPR's confrontation with American "imperialism," to encourage other "revolutionary people"

to do likewise according to the conditions facing them, and to contrast favorably with the Soviet Union's relative inactivity in the Middle Eastern crisis of the summer of 1958.

By the end of 1958, it was clear that both the domestic and the external programs of the Great Leap Forward had essentially failed. At home, major economic dislocations had opened, especially in agriculture. The crisis in the Taiwan Strait had produced serious risks of a clash with the United States, had exercised no significant intimidating effect on the Republic of China, and had revealed that the CPR could not rely on more than verbal Soviet support for such ventures. Both aspects of the Maoist program, furthermore, had strained Sino-Soviet relations. Indeed, the Great Leap Forward and its disastrous aftermath, which extended into 1960, constituted the most important single political watershed in the history of the CPR, a watershed from which the origins of the Cultural Revolution were to flow.

Following the pruning back of some of the most excessive features of the Leap in the autumn of 1958 and the virtual suspension of the Taiwan Strait crisis in October, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) convened in December, evidently to ratify a compromise already worked out in preliminary form by the top leadership. There is little doubt that at that time Mao was subjected to considerable criticism, but it also appears that this criticism was of a tactful variety calculated to save him as much face as possible, since he was still considered the necessary source and symbol of national unity and continuity. The compromise was aimed at giving Mao's major critics, led it would seem by the CPC's second ranking figure, Liu Shao-ch'i, reasonable assurance of more acceptable policies in the future.

The compromise, which was worked out not only then but also over the next several months, ran roughly as follows. At the top, a kind of dual leadership was created by the transfer of the state chairmanship from Mao to Liu, Mao retaining the key post of Chairmanship of the party Central Committee. Pending a definitive resolution

both of the difficult policy problems then confronting the leadership and the equally difficult problem of the future composition of the top leadership, the next (Ninth) Party Congress, which according to the constitution should have been held in 1961, would be postponed until some more propitious time. There would also be a partial division of policy responsibility comparable to the partial division of leadership: Liu and other relatively moderate, organization-minded leaders in the party and governmental apparatuses would have primary responsibility for economic policy; Mao would retain primary responsibility for practically everything else.

The Great Leap Forward would remain in effect, and the army would be used to keep it going through inputs of labor and other means, but the extreme features imparted to the "people's communes" in 1958 would continue to be deemphasized. A fresh installment of industrial aid would be sought from the Soviet Union (it was gotten in March 1959). Mao was conceded a continuation of his overwhelmingly dominant place in the propaganda and educational spheres--in short, his "cult of personality." After Defense Minister P'eng Te-huai was purged in the summer of 1959, Mao was also conceded a dominant role in military affairs through his admirer, the new Defense Minister Lin Piao. Although checked to some extent by the new Chief of Staff, the bureaucratically oriented Lo Jui-ch'ing, Lin Piao proceeded during the next few years to indoctrinate the somewhat disaffected armed forces more intensively than ever in the "thought of Mao Tse-tung."

Probably the most important of all the fields left to Mao's primary direction was that of foreign policy. It seems to have been clearly understood by Mao, however, and was probably insisted on by his critics, that Peking must create no further serious risks of a direct clash with the United States such as those of 1958. Accordingly, Mao reverted to his perennial concept of the Third World as a Chinese ideological and political sphere of influence--a sphere which, if energetically manipulated, could compensate for the weakness of Chinese national power and enable the CPR to make

headway not only against the United States but, increasingly, against the Soviet Union as well. The Maoist strategy, in brief, was and is that of encouraging violent proxy revolutions where feasible.

In a subdued manner at first, and then (after late 1959) with increasing vehemence, Mao initiated a polemic against Khrushchev, the burden of the attack being that the Soviet party was insufficiently resolute in confronting American "imperialism." Mao's colleagues seem to have acquiesced in the campaign, both because they were genuinely outraged by Khrushchev's moves toward détente with the United States and because they regarded Mao's growing preoccupation with this issue as valuable insurance against his unwelcome reinvolverment in domestic economic policy.

When Defense Minister P'eng Te-huai launched an outspoken (although unpublished) attack on Mao's policies during the Great Leap Forward period in the summer of 1959, he also rejected the policy compromise just outlined, and in particular, the increased use of the armed forces in support of the new, somewhat modified, version of the Leap. Thus, whether he knew it or not, he was assaulting a virtual consensus among the top leadership, and he thus evoked little support except from some of his military subordinates. He was therefore easily purged; Mao's admirer Lin Piao was appointed to succeed him; and Mao's continuing influence and the willingness of even the critics among his close colleagues to support him against critics outside the consensus were dramatized by a limited spurt of the Great Leap Forward in the late summer of 1959 (balanced however by a public deflation of the absurd production claims for 1958 and the initial targets for 1959).

P'eng was soon proven right in his criticisms not only of the original Great Leap Forward but of its modified version. A poor harvest in 1960, caused to a large extent by Maoist agricultural policies, necessitated sharp cuts in industrial investment and foreign trade at the end of the year. Maoist denunciation of Khrushchev, which came out into the open in the spring of 1960, brought on a withdrawal of Soviet industrial aid in the summer of 1960, dealing another devastating blow to the economy.

The policies adopted to deal with these setbacks amounted to an intensification of the trends embodied in the compromise of 1958-1959. Beginning about the end of 1960, under the direction of Liu Shao-ch'i and other party and governmental administrators, the Great Leap Forward and the "people's communes" were abandoned in all but name, and the peasants were given significantly increased material incentives to boost production. On the other hand, Mao continued to preside, if anything more firmly than ever, over those realms of policy that had been conceded to him. His cult continued to be propagated through all available media, including the education system; the long overdue fourth volume of his Selected Works, for example, was published in Chinese in September 1960, and in English the following year. Lin Piao's program of political indoctrination and control within the armed forces, with the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as its basis, was raised to an even higher pitch beginning in the autumn of 1960.

The policy toward the United States continued to be one of political struggle, or at least denunciation (the Kennedy administration was described as even "worse" than its predecessor), combined with a careful avoidance of direct military confrontation. Strategy in the Third World remained a central Maoist concern. The emphasis fell increasingly on opposition to India in all available arenas, on political cooperation with an ever more leftist Indonesia under Sukarno, and on sub-Saharan Africa as the major single region supposedly "ripe [after the wave of 'decolonizations' in 1960] for revolution." After a brief lull following the international Communist conference of November-December 1960, Mao seized on Soviet policy toward Albania as an issue over which to intensify his polemics against Khrushchev once more.

In retrospect, it seems reasonable to distinguish domestic and foreign policy as the two main pillars of the policy compromise and to consider recovery from the effects of the Great Leap Forward as the crucial feature of the former pillar (partly because it was central to the concerns of Mao's leading colleague-critics), and the

campaign against Khrushchev as the crucial feature of the latter pillar (because more than the other aspects of foreign policy it was the object of increasingly obsessive attention on Mao's part). Certainly the materialization of the objectives inherent in the policy compromise--economic recovery and the fall of Khrushchev--was to play an important role in destroying the viability of the compromise and in generating the political and psychological climate out of which the Cultural Revolution grew.

B. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE POLICY COMPROMISE (1962-1964)

The beginning of the breakdown of the policy compromise may be dated from the spring of 1962, when with the gathering of a good winter harvest it became clear that the worst of the economic crisis had been passed, and that the most powerful single inhibiting influence on serious policy debate within the leadership, namely, the need to recover from the crisis, was in the process of disappearing.

Unfortunately for Mao and to almost as great an extent for the opposition (as it now seems reasonable to term his major colleague-critics), the economic upturn, which continued through 1965, was accompanied by some disquieting political phenomena. Public opinion tended strongly toward loss of confidence in the entire regime and toward apathy and devotion to self-enrichment. The control of the party apparatus over the populace, which had been amazingly effective until the Great Leap Forward, had been seriously weakened by the upsetting effects of the Leap, its failure, and the ensuing retreat. Within the party apparatus itself, corrupt and "revisionist" tendencies (careerism, favoritism, nepotism, etc.) were evident at all levels. A number of Communist writers, under the thinnest of disguises, were criticizing Mao for the Great Leap Forward and were demanding the rehabilitation of P'eng Te-huai. Not unnaturally, P'eng himself sympathized with this demand, and in mid-1962, he composed a long unpublished justification of his own position.

If this situation was largely intolerable to the opposition, it was entirely so to Mao. From mid-1962, accordingly, he began to inject himself into the domestic policymaking arena more than at any time since 1958, although stopping short of demanding, or at any rate securing, a major modification of economic policy.

The first major sign of this trend was probably the Tenth Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee (September 1962). The outcome of this meeting is usually, but probably incorrectly, interpreted as reflecting a triumph for Mao; in reality, it seems rather to have indicated a compromise that fell short of what later turned out to be his objectives. Its main result was the so-called "socialist education campaign," which got under way rather slowly in 1963, under the dual direction of Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i, as a means of tightening political discipline among the lower party cadres as a preliminary to a similar program among the peasants. In the second half of 1964, clear signs of strain began to appear between Liu's wish to keep the campaign limited essentially to the original targets and Mao's determination to raise its sights to higher party cadres, at least as high as the officials of the departments of the party Secretariat. Mao's rationale was that, unless this were done, China would be led in a wrong direction by "those people in positions of authority within the party who take the capitalist road" (as he put it in his 23-point directive of January 1965).

From the end of 1963, and particularly from mid-1964, Mao led a limited campaign against dissident writers and intellectuals, focusing on those who had criticized him for the Great Leap Forward and challenged his belief in the necessity for maintaining political momentum through continual "struggle" against one target or opponent or another. The campaign featured a magnification of the already overpowering cult of Mao.

In 1963, the armed forces and the country at large were urged to emulate Lei Feng, a probably mythical dead soldier who had been allegedly a model of singleminded, and simpleminded, devotion to Mao. At the end of the year, the populace began to be exhorted to

"learn from the People's Liberation Army," which as a result of Lin Piao's activities was now considered the most Maoist and the best disciplined segment of society. During 1964, political departments modeled on those in the PLA and often staffed by retired or even active military personnel were set up within a large number of government agencies, notably those dealing with the economy. The combat forces of the PLA were increasingly indoctrinated in the spirit and practices of the old guerrilla days, before the mid-1950's when P'eng Te-huai began to introduce Soviet-style modernization and regularization into the armed forces; this process was climaxed, in the spring of 1965, by the abolition of ranks, titles, and insignia, and the reversion to the designations "commanders" and "fighters" rather than "officers" and "men."

Possibly influenced in part by then Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman's speech of December 13, 1963, in which he predicted the emergence in time of a new generation of Chinese leaders more pragmatic than the current one, Mao began to evince the fear (in his famous Ninth Letter of July 14, 1964, against Khrushchev, for example) that after his death his successors would succumb to Soviet-style "revisionism" and "take the capitalist road" (to him, two ways of saying the same thing) unless they could be kept under effective and constant pressure by a properly Maoist youth, and that the youth itself was insufficiently militant. The answer, in Mao's opinion, was to galvanize the youth by giving it a synthetic revolutionary experience that would resemble as closely as circumstances permitted the genuine revolutionary experience that he and his colleagues had undergone in the years before 1949. Mao's emphasis in 1964 on the PLA as the best model for society makes it clear that he was already thinking of Lin Piao and the armed forces as the main instrumentality through which this revolutionary experience could be imparted to the youth.

From these major political initiatives it can be inferred that Mao was determined not only to vindicate himself and the Great Leap and to humiliate and punish his critics--beginning with the lesser

ones and ending with the greater ones--but to build the momentum of "uninterrupted revolution" (a common phrase in Maoist propaganda during the Great Leap Forward) inexorably into the Communist Chinese political system. Although Mao has never defined this concept in print, it appears to mean rapid and continuous political movement, in a direction none too well explained, characterized by social equality and uniformity and motivated by hatred of, and struggle against, various successive combinations of domestic and external opponents, rather than by material incentives. To Mao, the Great Leap Forward probably appears, even in retrospect, as the quintessence of "uninterrupted revolution," or at least it would have been had it not been wrecked (to his mind) by the bungling of his colleagues and subordinates, bad weather, and Soviet betrayal. His initiatives just mentioned look very much like preparations, largely political in nature, for a new Great Leap Forward when conditions should permit. And yet it seems clear, from the fact that Mao is not known to have made any serious attempt during this period to launch a new Leap, that he fully realized that conditions were not ripe; he may even have concluded in retrospect that conditions had not been ripe in 1958.

Furthermore, the question of power at the top of the party was still unresolved; the opposition was too strong to make a new Leap possible at that time. Various indications could be cited in support of this hypothesis. In 1962, a few weeks before the Tenth Plenary Session, Liu Shao-ch'i republished his major work, How To Be a Good Communist, which had been written in 1939 and now proceeded to outsell any single volume of Mao's Selected Works. No further plenary sessions of the Central Committee were held for four years after the Tenth, the logical inference being that during that period both power and policy were in a state too controverted and unsettled to make the calling of such a session feasible. In January 1965, when Liu Shao-ch'i's term as Chairman of the CPR expired, he was re-elected, and to this extent at least the dual leadership originally created in 1958-1959 was preserved. There was

some evidence at the same time of two countervailing trends that were to become very important later: a growth in Lin Piao's prestige and a tendency for Premier Chou En-lai to side with Mao and Lin rather than with the opposition led by Liu Shao-ch'i; Lin moved to the head of the list of Vice Premiers (from second), whereas party General Secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing, with whom Chou had had some differences, moved only from fourth to third (on account of the elimination of P'eng Te-huai from the list).

Mao's increased assertiveness in domestic affairs, short as yet of a major challenge to existing economic policy, was paralleled by a somewhat increased assertiveness by the opposition in foreign policy, at least with respect to the Third World, but not by a major challenge to the whole Maoist foreign policy. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 had from Mao's standpoint adverse political effects that were comparable to, although less obvious and severe than, the effects of the Cuban missile crisis on Khrushchev's policies. In the spring of 1963, Liu Shao-ch'i took an unprecedented step for a Communist Chinese chief of state by paying a state visit to four friendly Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, and North Vietnam). In addition to mending fences on behalf of the Chinese Communist regime as a whole, Liu probably intended to increase his own familiarity with and influence over policy toward such areas at the expense of Mao. More specifically, he held talks in Indonesia on the policies of the two governments toward the Indonesian "Confrontation" with Malaysia, and in North Vietnam on the deal then apparently being worked out between Peking and Hanoi, under which the former was to give increased political and military support to the latter's struggle in South Vietnam in return for somewhat greater support by the Vietnamese for the Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. When he visited Africa at the end of 1963, Chou En-lai characteristically equivocated between the two positions--although, as has been suggested, he soon began to move toward the Maoist position--by giving expression to both: the Maoist love of revolutionary appeals and the preference for diplomacy.

even if often unconventional diplomacy, that can apparently be associated with the opposition, including Liu Shao-ch'i.

There was no change during this period in the policy of non-confrontation with the United States. The CPR took care not to provoke the United States during the Laotian crisis that culminated in the spring of 1962, followed a strictly deterrent and defensive strategy during the tension in the Taiwan Strait that arose at that same time, and declared a unilateral armistice in its border with India the day after the United States lifted its quarantine on Cuba, thus freeing its hands to give primary attention to the crisis in South Asia (November 20-21, 1962).

Similarly, there was apparent agreement within the Chinese Communist elite on the continuation and intensification of the polemic with Khrushchev by such means as efforts to win over other Communist parties or to split them if their leaderships could not be persuaded. The Soviet role in the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian border war, the nuclear test ban treaty (which the CPR interpreted as Soviet collusion with the United States and as a conscious harassment of the maturing Chinese nuclear weapons program), and Khrushchev's unsuccessful efforts to arrange another international Communist conference to discipline the CPC, all served to raise the temperature of the Chinese polemic. At the beginning of 1963, and again in July 1964, Mao took the fateful step of referring publicly to Chinese territorial claims on Soviet Asia, an issue of the greatest sensitivity in Moscow and one certain to find all the Soviet leaders ranged against Peking, however much they might disagree on other aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In spite of the appearance of anti-Soviet unity among the Chinese Communist leadership, it is possible, although it cannot be proved, that at least some of Mao's opposition hoped that after the departure of Khrushchev an accommodation might be worked out with a less unalterably anti-Chinese successor. If so, this hope was not shared by Mao.

Like the economic recovery of 1962, the overthrow of Khrushchev in mid-October 1964 tended to remove a major support on which the

policy compromise of 1958-1959 had rested. This was so because his successors were sufficiently willing to modify his emotionally anti-Chinese line that they offered the CPR, in October 1964 and February 1965, a resumption of economic aid in exchange for a cessation of polemics and renewal of political cooperation. There is some evidence, tenuous to be sure and evidently of Soviet origin, that some of Mao's colleagues deemed this proposal at least worth examining. It is quite certain, however, that Mao would have none of it. For one thing, a very similar deal had actually been made with Khrushchev exactly a decade earlier, and he had then proceeded (from the Chinese point of view) to violate it by going too far toward détente with the United States. Secondly, the perpetually conflict-oriented Mao feared the corrupting effect of contact with Soviet "revisionism" on his own colleagues and people, and viewed struggle against it as a valuable if not indispensable backdrop to his own increasingly radical domestic program. Thirdly, Mao sought in his campaign against Soviet "revisionism," as in the other aspects of his foreign policy and in his domestic policy, vindication for his claim to being the only living "continuator" of the Marxist-Leninist tradition and the greatest revolutionary and statesman of the contemporary world.

In sum, by the end of 1964 the bases of the policy compromise of 1958-1959 had been seriously weakened, and in fact largely eliminated, and a higher level of controversy within the top Chinese leadership had been created than had existed at any time since 1958. All parties to the controversy--for Mao and Liu were only the two most important--were about to be confronted by a major challenge to their assumptions and policies.

II

THE CRISIS OF 1965

Although the escalation of the Vietnamese crisis in early 1965 certainly did not cause the Cultural Revolution, as some writers have argued, it certainly contributed to it. During the preceding months, Chinese comments on the crisis had varied in tone, a probable reflection of differences of opinion within the leadership. There had been numerous expressions of concern over the rising tension in Vietnam during the second half of 1964, and yet in January 1965 Mao told the American journalist, Edgar Snow, that he expected the United States not to escalate but rather to withdraw in a few years.

The use of American airpower in North and South Vietnam beginning in February 1965, followed by the introduction of American ground forces into South Vietnam soon afterward, created a problem for Peking unparalleled since the Korean War. There was naturally a lively discussion of the crisis, flaring into considerable debate, within the Chinese leadership. Since the available evidence on the course of this debate is fragmentary and rather difficult to interpret, the analysis that follows is offered in a distinctly tentative spirit.

A. DEBATE OVER ROLE OF THE CPR IN VIETNAM

It appears that there was a considerable measure of agreement as to the nature of the problem created for the CPR's external security by American action in Vietnam, but not as to the proper response nor as to the implications of the crisis for the Chinese domestic situation. A full-scale American invasion of North Vietnam, with the attendant danger of a collapse of the North Vietnamese regime, was regarded as improbable in the light of American

recollections of the Korean experience, but Peking took care not to raise the issue by refraining from any public statements of what it would do if such an invasion should take place. More was said about, and a higher probability seems to have been attached to, the chances of an extension of American air attacks to the CPR (South China, presumably) under the doctrine of hot pursuit. There was concern over the possibility that American pressures, especially air attacks on North Vietnam, might lead Hanoi to call off the struggle in South Vietnam, to which all Chinese leaders claimed to be committed and which Mao and his immediate followers in particular wanted to see continued, although at a lower level of violence and in a more "protracted" manner than Hanoi evidently had in mind, until a proxy victory for Chinese-style "people's war" over American "imperialism" could be won.

Disagreement over the Chinese role in the crisis was greatly sharpened by the growing Soviet involvement. Mao, it appears, feared that this involvement might increase Soviet influence over North Vietnam, and perhaps over the situation in China itself, and ultimately lead to a settlement short of victory, or alternatively that it might drag the CPR into the war. As will be suggested shortly, at least some of his colleagues disagreed with much of this argument, and the result was a compromise. In February and March 1965, Soviet requests for air transit rights and air base facilities in Southwest China for staging Soviet personnel and equipment on the way to North Vietnam were rejected, but agreement was reached for surface transit by rail; this seemed to avoid the major drawbacks, from the Maoist point of view, of an airlift. It was also agreed among the Chinese leadership that the flow of Chinese military equipment to North Vietnam should be increased, and some vague threats of direct intervention by Chinese ground forces in the fighting were made, conditional on an invitation from the "Vietnamese people" (meaning presumably Hanoi and the National Liberation Front jointly) and on the objective requirements of the situation as determined in Peking (not Hanoi).

It was possible for the Soviet Union to get agreement in Peking to the quiet transshipment of a limited amount of military equipment, largely defensive in character, to North Vietnam, but not to get agreement to broader Soviet political objectives. One of these was to use the Vietnamese crisis as a means of increasing Soviet influence within the Communist world, under the slogan of "unity of action" on Vietnam, at the expense of the Chinese, whether they cooperated or resisted. To this end, the Soviet party convened a small consultative conference in Moscow in early March 1965, as a preliminary it was hoped to a later plenary conference of all parties. Given his views on Soviet "revisionism" and Soviet foreign policy, these moves were anathema to Mao; the Chinese party boycotted the conference, and Chinese (and North Vietnamese) students rioted outside the American Embassy in Moscow as the conference opened.

Not all of Mao's colleagues, however, agreed that the Vietnamese crisis should be made to widen rather than narrow the gap separating the Chinese and Soviet parties. There is some evidence that Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing did not, and it is highly probable that Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing did not. In an important and forceful article published on May 10, he seems to have advocated (although this interpretation is admittedly controversial) broad political cooperation among Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi, so as to win the war in Vietnam and in the process restore a viable relationship between the CPR and the Soviet Union. Lo referred to the possibility of an American strategic surprise attack on the CPR with thermonuclear weapons and advocated extensive pre-attack mobilization, presumably with the aid of modern equipment to be acquired from the Soviet Union. He was a "hawk" in that he seemingly recommended an "active defense" and a "strategic counteroffensive" by Hanoi against American forces in South Vietnam, along the lines of Soviet operations against German forces during World War II, and advocated energetic Chinese support for such a strategy, although he was vague as to exactly how far he favored going in this regard.

He went so far as to brand the opponents of his proposals, presumably including Mao himself, as no better than Chamberlain and Daladier, in the sense that they in effect appeased the main enemy (Germany then, the United States now) motivated by their dislike of the Soviet Union. It is hardly surprising that Lo's proposals were wholly unacceptable, on both military and political grounds, to Mao and his supporters.

In his pronouncements on Vietnam made later in 1965, Lo modified his original position considerably, presumably because like Mao's other opponents he considered that the domestic dispute was even more important than the dispute over external policy and that the opposition should make its stand mainly over the former. Lo was fundamentally opposed to Mao's and Lin Piao's "guerrillaization" of the armed forces, much as P'eng Te-huai had opposed the Great Leap Forward and in particular its effects on the PLA. It was almost certainly for this domestic opposition, rather than for his views on military strategy and foreign policy, that Lo was quietly purged in early 1966, as P'eng had been six and a half years before.

The authoritative answer to Lo was given, presumably on Mao's behalf, in Lin Piao's famous tract, "Long Live the Victory of People's War" (September 3, 1965), a document which bore a number of other purposes as well. In the first place, this document announced Lin as the leading candidate for the succession to Mao, if not as his already chosen heir. Secondly, it defended the Maoist domestic program by holding up the strenuous history of the CPC's rise to power, and its military campaigns against the Japanese invader in particular, as the model for China's political future, one possible aspect of which he identified as an American invasion. The Chinese Communist model was also exhibited, thirdly, for the emulation of anti-"imperialist" revolutionaries in other countries, the underdeveloped countries above all. Revolutions in such areas, Lin insisted, must be Chinese-style "people's wars" waged in the spirit of "self-reliance," i.e., without major overt aid or direction from any external source, even (or perhaps especially) the CPR.

Although Lin did not intend the applicability of his message to be confined to Vietnam, he certainly did not exclude Vietnam, and in that context he presumably meant to warn against any undue outside involvement in the struggle in South Vietnam by the Soviet Union, the CPR, or even Hanoi. Logically enough, he made no threats of any kind of direct Chinese intervention in the Vietnamese struggle. He explicitly rejected the idea of cooperation with the Soviet Union, in Vietnam or in any other context.

B. DOMESTIC PROGRAMS

As though keynoted by Lin's trumpet call, a meeting of the CPC Central Committee (not a Plenary Session) convened later in September and heard a summons by Mao to a campaign against ideological deviations at all levels. A majority of his colleagues evidently objected to one degree or another. The opposition seems to have argued, among other things, that the Vietnamese crisis necessitated a moderation, or at least a nonintensification, of the Maoist domestic program; whether the use of the Vietnamese issue in this context was sincere or tactical it would be hard to say.

Mao for his part probably argued at that time, and certainly has argued in other contexts, that the Vietnamese situation, whatever its other aspects, creates a valuable psychological and political climate for his domestic program; it is probably for that reason that the Chinese mass media have cultivated in the minds of the Chinese public what has been aptly called a "siege mentality." At various times, and especially in 1965, Maoist sources, as we have just seen in the case of Lin Piao's tract, have described the American threat as one of an invasion of the CPR. The opposition has presumably regarded this eventuality as either a myth, or (to the extent that Maoist ploys might conceivably tend to induce it) an unmitigated horror, and Maoist talk about it as an opportunistic device for legitimating the Maoist domestic program. The last of these views is probably correct, for Mao has drawn the convenient conclusion that this "threat" must be met by further "guerrillaization"

of the PLA for a "protracted war," supplemented by a populace mobilized along similar lines in a vast militia.

The most that Mao was able to get from the Central Committee at that time, apparently, was a modest indoctrination program aimed at intellectuals and directed by P'eng Chen, the municipal boss of Peking and hence of the city where most of the intellectuals lived. Feeling frustrated and ill at ease in Peking, Mao withdrew to Shanghai in October or early November, there to watch developments and make plans for his next major move. He soon gave some indication, through the press which he still largely controlled, of how his thoughts were running. On November 10 a Shanghai newspaper carried an article, which was soon endorsed by the Liberation Army Daily, urging greater pressures on the intellectuals, and particularly on one (Wu Han, a playwright and official) who had criticized Mao. The following day, a strong editorial in the People's Daily and Red Flag rejected the Soviet call to "unity of action" on Vietnam, a line that had considerable appeal to many Communist parties, including Asian ones anxious to enlarge their autonomy with respect to Moscow as well as Peking. With this rejection as a rationale, the CPR seems to have begun about this time to put difficulties in the way of Soviet rail shipments to Vietnam without stopping them entirely; so at least the Soviet Union has charged, and although its accusations are probably exaggerated, they seem to have some foundation.

C. THE CPR AND THE THIRD WORLD

In the meantime, the CPR's policy toward the Third World, for which the Chinese leadership, and Mao in particular, had had great expectations, had been encountering shattering setbacks. Peking had been hoping to use the Second Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled to convene at Algiers in late June 1965, as a major propaganda forum, but Chinese political pressures had so alienated the more moderate countries to be represented at the conference that they used the Algerian coup of June 1965 as an excuse for postponing the

conference. In October, when the CPR finally saw that it could not have the conference on its own terms, especially in view of its other setbacks in the Third World, it agreed to an indefinite postponement. In mid-September, the CPR had tried to prevent Pakistan from calling off its "people's war" in Kashmir and its military operations against India in the face of Indian counteraction and political pressures exerted by the United Nations, the United States, and the Soviet Union, but Chinese actions were crude and ineffective and if anything tended to hasten the end of the crisis on terms unfavorable to Pakistan. In October the CPR had to witness helplessly the bloody near-destruction of the large and pro-Chinese Indonesian Communist Party at the hands of the Indonesian Army, after a clumsy attempt at a coup of which the CPC was aware in advance and to which it evidently consented and gave some aid, but which it probably regarded from the beginning as a high-risk operation. Maoist hopes for a revolutionary trend in Indonesia, the rest of Southeast Asia, and the whole Third World were dealt a heavy blow by this fiasco. Finally, developments in Africa, where the Maoists in the early 1960's had seen the greatest revolutionary promise, were moving unfavorably in a number of countries, notably Ghana, whose pro-Chinese President Nkrumah was overthrown in February 1966.

These defeats were obviously serious both for Mao and the opposition. The sense of isolation and frustration of both, with respect to the Third World, was greatly enhanced. There are several signs of this tendency, including the termination in 1965 of a series of personal statements by Mao on international issues relating to the "struggle" against American "imperialism" in the Third World (although statements with strong Maoist overtones continued to be issued after each nuclear test), and the termination of a series of friendship treaties with leftist, non-Communist states of the Third World, all but one of which had been signed since Liu Shao-ch'i's assumption of the post of Chairman of the CPR. But the defeats were even worse for Mao than for the opposition. Far from admitting

error or defeat, he felt more compelled than ever to seek vindication. But vindication was obviously easier, as well as even more desirable, at home than abroad, and it was to domestic affairs that Mao's attention mainly turned at the beginning of 1966.

III

THE MAOIST OFFENSIVE (1966)

A. LAUNCHING OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Mao's main concerns at the beginning of 1966 seem to have been to regain control of Peking, where his influence was somewhat eroded by his long absence, and to get the Cultural Revolution, as his political campaign was to become known, moving. Since P'eng Chen still dominated the municipal party and governmental machinery in Peking, and since as the man then in charge of purging the intellectuals, with many of whom he had ties, he was proceeding too slowly for Mao's taste, it was clear to Mao that P'eng must go. Beyond that, Mao was bent on using the army and the pro-Maoist segment of the youth to pressure the party Central Committee into sanctioning the Cultural Revolution, and then to press ahead with it.

The first few months of 1966 were occupied by devious and obscure maneuvering toward these ends, while Mao remained in the Shanghai area. At a meeting sponsored by the General Political Department of the PLA General Staff in January, at least the general nature of what would be expected of the armed forces was explained to key members of its political apparatus. Among the signs of an increased political role for the PLA was the introduction at that time of a propaganda phrase describing it as the "main pillar of the proletarian dictatorship," a role previously reserved for the CPC party apparatus headed by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

According to both official and unofficial Chinese Communist sources, which however have been rebutted by others, an anti-Maoist plot or coup of some sort was planned during February 1966. Its main active participants have been alleged to be P'eng Chen, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Lu Ting-yi (the soon-to-be-purged director of the

CPC Central Committee's Propaganda Department), and Yang Shang-k'un (a key figure in the party Secretariat). Also, they were said to have received some support from Liu and Teng. Although it seems unlikely that the plot took place exactly along the lines described for a number of reasons, including the fact that the very existence of such a plot was later denied among others by Chou En-lai, the possibility that active resistance to Mao and the Cultural Revolution did take shape at about that time cannot be ruled out. At some time in the spring of 1966, for example, pictures of Mao were taken down in Peking, and it was widely rumored that he was dead.

These reports turned out to be greatly exaggerated. For the time being, however, Mao continued to work behind the scenes. In March, Lin Piao began to become increasingly prominent as Mao's major spokesman in urging more intensive study and application of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung." During late March and much of April, Liu Shao-ch'i was out of the country on a state visit to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Burma; whatever the reasons for his trip, it was taken advantage of by the Maoists to increase the pressure on P'eng Chen, one of whose weaknesses lay in the fact that he was never able to gain effective support from the other leaders of the party apparatus (P'eng himself was the second-ranking member of the party Secretariat, after Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who probably regarded P'eng as a rival to be gotten rid of). A series of strong editorials in the Liberation Army Daily that began in April and urged a thorough house-cleaning of the intellectual community was one of the means of pressure. Another was the movement of military units loyal to Mao and Lin toward Peking from the Yangtze Valley.

For his part, Chou En-lai postponed a scheduled trip to Rumania and Albania until June, probably in order to be on hand to play his part in the maneuvering. He was clearly on the Maoist side, the most plausible reasons being his friction with Teng Hsiao-p'ing (already mentioned), his realization that the Maoist offensive was likely to be irresistible, and a desire to be in a position to influence and when necessary restrain the offensive from within.

The Maoists in turn accepted him because of his immense ability and experience both as a politician and an administrator; his reputation for not aspiring to supreme personal power; and the fact that he possessed a formidable power base, or more accurately asset, in the shape of the modern sector of the economy, over which he as Premier largely presided. Chou probably proffered allegiance to Mao during the period of the Cultural Revolution in exchange for some sort of commitment from Mao not to encourage his followers to disrupt the economy.

Early in May, Mao decided that the time for a final offensive against P'eng Chen had come. Accordingly, he made his first public appearance for more than five months, in the company of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Chou En-lai, Lin Piao, and an Albanian delegation, and then returned to Peking. Presumably in order to dramatize Mao's re-emergence, a nuclear device was tested on May 9. In Peking, Mao somehow secured a Central Committee directive (dated May 16 and published a year later) that in effect condemned P'eng Chen's cautious approach to the Cultural Revolution and put Mao's program, the extreme character of which was only to become apparent some months later, into effect. P'eng fell from power a few days later under obscure circumstances; it seems that the means employed involved a combination of military and student pressures; it was at that time, in late May, that the first Red Guard units were formed among college and middle-school students in Peking, under the direction and with the logistical support of the PLA. This stage of the Maoist offensive culminated in the seizure of the major municipal newspapers in Peking on June 1 and the proclamation of a new party committee for the city, headed by First Secretary Li Hsueh-feng of the party's North China Bureau, on June 3.

Believing apparently that he had accomplished all that he could at that stage, Mao then retreated once more to the Shanghai area. This withdrawal left the task of coping with the burgeoning and disorderly Red Guards in the hands of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. There can be little doubt that Mao intended to use

their handling of the problem, no matter how they behaved, as a weapon against them at a later stage. The method adopted by Liu and Teng was the standard Chinese Communist one of sending "work teams" of cadres to deal with the Red Guards; later, of course, Liu and Teng were to be accused of having tried to use these work teams to suppress the Cultural Revolution.

Meanwhile, Mao was making preparations to manage the Cultural Revolution in his way, quite different from that of Liu and Teng. At some time during this period, he began to build a network of Cultural Revolution Groups virtually paralleling the party apparatus and pyramiding in a supreme Group led by Ch'en Po-ta, one of Mao's most trusted advisers and propagandists. Since Mao was anxious not to admit publicly that he was bypassing the machinery for making and implementing policy that was prescribed by the party constitution, this Group was made nominally subordinate to the Central Committee. In reality, however, it was subordinate to Mao himself and formed part of a kind of "kitchen cabinet" that he was creating to help him direct the Cultural Revolution. Among the most prominent members of this group, in addition to Ch'en Po-ta, were Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing (one of whose ruling passions was obviously a strong dislike of Wang Kuang-mei, the wife of Liu Shao-ch'i), and K'ang Sheng (a specialist in party work who had a long-standing quarrel with Liu himself). Chou En-lai should be thought of as an ally of this group rather than as a member of it; to a lesser extent, the same can be said of Lin Piao, although his support among the senior generals was weak and he owed most of his political influence to Mao's favor. In addition to forming this network of Cultural Revolution Groups, Mao somehow purged Lu Ting-yi, the Director of the CPC Central Committee's Propaganda Department, in July and also secured the irregular naming of some new members of the party Secretariat. T'ao Chu, until now First Secretary of the party's Central South Bureau, was the main beneficiary of this process, since he succeeded Lu and became one of the new members of the Secretariat.

By July both sides were clearly maneuvering for a major test of political strength, which it was decided at some point should take the form of another plenary session (the Eleventh) of the party Central Committee. Probably at T'ao Chu's suggestion, Mao (or possibly a double) swam or paddled in the Yangtze River for several hours on July 16, a feat that was given massive and (to the outsider) ludicrous publicity. On July 22, Liu Shao-ch'i made his last public statement when he appeared at a rally to protest an American bombing of targets near Hanoi on July 19; Liu was the only one of the speakers on that occasion who did not denounce the Soviet Union.

B. MAOIST FOREIGN POLICY

Sino-Soviet relations had remained tense during the period of the launching of the Maoist offensive. The Soviet leadership seems to have been greatly disturbed, not only by continued Chinese political obstructionism regarding the Vietnamese crisis, but even more by the planned destruction of the previously ruling party apparatus in an important Communist state and its replacement by sponsored anarchy, a phenomenon unique in political history. The loud fanfare by the Soviet Union over the renewal of its alliance with Outer Mongolia in January 1966, and the movements of Soviet troops into Outer Mongolia that seem to have occurred soon afterward, are probably to be interpreted as Soviet pressures and threats against the CPR. These occurred at about the time of the February plot (if there actually was such a plan), and one of the charges against Yang Shang-k'un was that he had taped some of Mao's private conversations and turned the tapes over to the Soviet ambassador. The Soviet Union was probably threatening, and may even have actually been contemplating, military intervention, provided that an acceptable anti-Maoist coalition emerged that would be willing to cooperate. But one of the leading anti-Maoists was P'eng Chen, who was especially anti-Soviet. Probably because of a desire not to give aid and comfort to him, and also because of the failure of

an effective anti-Maoist coalition to crystallize, the Soviets hesitated, until the movement of pro-Maoist military units to North China and the emergence of the Red Guards made it clear that intervention would involve an excessive cost. Meanwhile, the Soviet party had circulated a secret letter at the beginning of the year charging the Chinese with serious obstructionism regarding Vietnam, including the transit of Soviet equipment, and the Chinese had used the letter (in late March) as a welcome pretext for refusing to send a delegation to the Soviet party's Twenty-third Congress, a boycott unprecedented for the CPC. This action was taken in spite of a Japanese Communist Party delegation that visited China in February and March to plead for "unity of action" on Vietnam and for Chinese representation at the Soviet congress; according to the Japanese version of the episode, Mao personally vetoed acceptance of the Japanese proposals. By about the middle of the year, the CPR had withdrawn its ambassador from Moscow, and the Soviet Union had withdrawn its ambassador from Peking.

Although the Chinese leadership, or at any rate the Maoists, does not seem to have regarded the Vietnamese crisis as a clear and present danger to the CPR, there was enough uncertainty on this point so that the termination of the American bombing pause in late January 1966 without further escalation was apparently greeted with some relief in Peking. During the ensuing spring, according to some later accounts, Sino-American discussions on Vietnam at Warsaw seem to have had the effect of reassuring the CPC that there was not likely to be an American attack on the CPR unless the latter took a major initiative first, such as sending combat forces into Vietnam; this the Maoists, whose views were largely controlling, clearly had no intention of doing. Certain developments in the United States, such as President Johnson's speech of July 12, 1966, expressing hope for an ultimate Sino-American reconciliation, were probably also reassuring to Peking as regards American intentions.

The setbacks that the CPR had sustained in the Third World had tended to disillusion the Maoists with all non-Communist governments, notably with that of Indonesia, with which the CPR waged a

running propaganda fight over the maltreatment of Chinese in Indonesia and attacks on the Chinese embassy. Along with the even more important consideration that all the major leaders found their time largely occupied by domestic affairs, this attitude undoubtedly contributed to the absence of high-level state visits outside the CPR after June 1966. In lieu of diplomacy, the CPR shifted increasingly to international "people's" or front organizations, especially Afro-Asian ones. These organizations were too ineffective, however, to serve as adequate transmission belts for "people's war" and the ideals of the Cultural Revolution, which Mao clearly vested with universal applicability. Another more effective, or at least more dramatic, way remained to be found.

C. THE MAOISTS TAKE CONTROL

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee (August 1-12, 1966), which was not attended by all Central Members, opened in Peking in a political atmosphere that was highly favorable to the Maoist side. The Red Guards were becoming increasingly active, and Mao on August 5 had written his famous poster, "Bombard the Headquarters," which by clear implication called for the overthrow of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and probably also the entire machinery of the party's Central Secretariat, by the Red Guards. On August 10, presumably as another means of demonstrating and enhancing popular support for himself as against his opponents, Mao walked alone and unannounced in the streets. In addition, the hall in which the Central Committee met was packed with soldiers and Red Guards, an unprecedented step that virtually destroyed the orderly working of the meeting and indeed the party constitution itself. In this atmosphere and with the strong support of Lin Piao, Mao prevailed. A directive of August 8 called for a full-fledged Cultural Revolution in intellectual circles, with the important qualification that high-level scientists and technicians should be spared its full force as long as they did their work well and showed no disloyalty to the state. It appears that the rank order of the

members of the Politburo was reshuffled and that Lin Piao was made the only Vice-chairman of the Central Committee (he had previously been last of five), the latter being a step that according to the party constitution could only have been taken by a National Party Congress. The final communique of the Plenary Session naturally endorsed the Cultural Revolution and gave a thoroughly Maoist interpretation of China's domestic and external situation.

In order to dramatize his reliance on the Red Guards and inspire them to "rebel," as he put it, Mao appeared before a total of approximately 11 million Red Guards from many parts of China at a series of eight gigantic rallies held in Peking from August 16 until late November. At these rallies, the party leadership appeared in a new order reflecting a combination of the voting at the Eleventh Plenary Session and Mao's informal preferences; the most important changes were a dramatic rise in standing for Lin Piao, T'ao Chu, and the Maoist clique already mentioned, and a substantial decline for Liu Shao-ch'i. Lin was displayed in such a way as to make it obvious that he was Mao's chosen heir; for one thing he, rather than Mao, made the major speeches. From the very first rally Chou En-lai, who appeared as the third-ranking leader, urged the Red Guards to observe discipline and not to disrupt the working of the economy.

Chou's advice had little effect, however. The Red Guards began by going on a rampage in Peking in August against any individuals, many of them harmless, who had earned their displeasure. As they began to fan out to other areas during the ensuing months, the same began to happen elsewhere. China seemed to be in danger of degenerating into chaos. The impact of the Red Guards' activities in Peking during the autumn of 1966 was sufficient virtually to paralyze and destroy the operations of the central machinery of the CPC. This was especially true of its Secretariat, the principal base of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, at whom Mao's anger had been rising since the Eleventh Plenary Session because of his (Teng's) growing distaste for the excesses of the Maoist leadership and the Red Guards. He and Liu, especially the latter, began to be criticized and to

make "self-criticisms" at private meetings during the autumn; subsequently, they were denounced publicly by the Red Guards, but not yet attacked in the official press. At that stage, their overthrow and humiliation were evidently seen as necessary to the progress of the Cultural Revolution; it was not until several months later that their main role in the Maoist program became that of scapegoats to distract the Red Guards from activities destructive of public order and the economy.

D. RED GUARD ACTIVISM

The months following the Eleventh Plenary Session were lively ones in the field of foreign policy. On September 7, the noisy but essentially low-risk Maoist policy on Vietnam was dramatized by a public statement denouncing the United States, made during a Sino-American ambassadorial conversation at Warsaw. An even more dramatic, but equally riskless, anti-American gesture was made a few weeks later, on October 27, when a short-range missile with a nuclear warhead was successfully tested at the time of President Johnson's visit to South Vietnam and Thailand. The CPR also made propaganda capital out of a fifth nuclear test, which was held on December 28.

Such gestures may have pleased Mao and his clique, but they did relatively little to release the anti-"imperialist" energies of the Red Guards themselves. Within safe limits, Mao was no doubt happy to see Red Guards, or other revolutionary Chinese, struggle against the CPR's various self-proclaimed external opponents where feasible, whether within the CPR or abroad, and he certainly felt it right and necessary to endorse such actions whenever they occurred, again within limits of safety. On the other hand, many of the actual steps taken undoubtedly reflected the local initiative of pro-Maoists who were trying to implement their understanding of Mao's vague directives to "rebel."

The first significant episode of "Red Guard diplomacy" occurred at the expense of the weak and highly vulnerable Portuguese

authorities in Macao in late November. After two months of massive demonstrations and some hints, probably of the bluffing variety, of Chinese military intervention, the Portuguese virtually gave in and conceded to the Maoists a dominant place in the colony's political life as the price of retaining formal sovereignty, which Peking clearly had no desire to assume in any case.

The last months of 1966 saw a similar upsurge of Red Guard-style activities along the Sino-Soviet border, mainly in the Manchurian sector. Probably without explicit directions from Peking, which clearly has no real desire for a border war with the Soviet Union, but with the help of local PLA commanders, Red Guard units organized anti-Soviet demonstrations that, according to seemingly reliable Soviet sources, sometimes took the form of driving Chinese peasants across the border with instructions to occupy land that was said to be rightfully theirs. The Soviet Union seems to have responded with a judicious mixture of firmness and flexibility, so that a major crisis did not ensue.

About the end of 1966, a large number of Chinese diplomats stationed in foreign countries, including nearly all the ambassadors, began to be called home for indoctrination in the ideals and methods of the Cultural Revolution. This step was to have some dramatic results in 1967.

IV

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1967

A. INTERNAL DISRUPTIONS

By the end of 1966 it was clear that the Maoists (i.e., Mao, Chiang Ch'ing, and the Cultural Revolution Group) intended to extend the Cultural Revolution to the economy and the provinces. The first of these steps seems to have brought objections from Chou En-lai, who was accordingly criticized in Red Guard publications in early 1967. Yet Chou was able to survive the criticism and even to moderate the proposals to which he objected, for example by ensuring that there should be no systematic extension of the Cultural Revolution into the provinces. Mao's drive for an assault on the regional and provincial machines of the party apparatus was not to be stopped so easily. It seems probable that the fall of T'ao Chu at the beginning of 1967 was due to objections on his part to the assault just mentioned as well as to his rapid rise, which had begun to cast him in the role of a potential rival to Lin Piao.

By mid-January 1967, a number of cities were becoming seriously affected by Red Guard violence directed against the local party "power holders." This was notably true in Shanghai, where a "power seizure" by the Maoists occurred that was then held up as a model for the rest of the country. Seeing in the accompanying chaos an opportunity to improve their condition, many workers began to strike and in various other ways to demonstrate their deep-seated "economism," as the Maoists called it. The hard-pressed party apparatus in some cases encouraged the workers to make their demands, apparently as a means of counterbalancing the Maoists and winning the workers' good will.

By late January the level of disorder in many of the cities, and in the countryside immediately surrounding the cities, was so

serious that the Maoist leadership in Peking saw no alternative but to call in the army, both to restore order and to aid the Cultural Revolution. Most of the senior military commanders had evidently felt serious reservations about the Cultural Revolution all along, a hypothesis that would be consistent with the fact that many of them were denounced in Red Guard publications in early 1967. It appears that they agreed to promote the Cultural Revolution, as distinct from merely restoring order, only after some bargaining, their main gain apparently being a commitment that the Cultural Revolution should not be pushed unduly within the army.

The army thereupon set up Military Control Commissions in many parts of the country and proceeded to exercise power in those areas at the expense both of the party apparatus and the Red Guards. Some of the latter, as well as other elements willing to cooperate with the military authorities, were designated "revolutionary rebels" and under army auspices began the task of restoring order in the name of promoting the Cultural Revolution. The Maoist leadership rationalized this process by describing it as the formation of "three-way alliances" composed of "revolutionary rebels," the army, and pro-Maoist defectors from the party apparatus. As time went on, however, Peking became worried by the growing power of the army and the ruthlessness that it displayed on occasion toward the more disorderly elements among the Red Guards. The Maoist leadership tried to deal with the Red Guards, beginning at the end of March 1967, by a propaganda effort to divert their political energies against a more harmless target, "China's Khrushchev" (Liu Shao-ch'i) and his local agents, often the former first secretary of the provincial party committee in question. The effort to restrain the military took the form of an unpublished directive of April 6 ordering the army to be more circumspect in its use of force. The army, playing an uncomfortable and unaccustomed role, complied to a considerable extent. The result was a major upsurge, beginning in May, of Red Guard violence, not effectively distracted by remote targets like "China's Khrushchev." One of its manifestations was the disorders in Hong Kong.

The Maoist leadership pressed ahead with the Cultural Revolution on other fronts as well during the spring and summer of 1967. There were powerful Red Guard political pressures on most of the Vice Premiers (notably Foreign Minister Chen Yi, but not including Defense Minister Lin Piao), evidently as a prelude to a future attack on Chou En-lai, whether sanctioned by Mao himself or not. Lin Piao, himself, (or possibly the initiative was undertaken by some political adviser like Director Hsiao Hua of the General Political Department of the PLA General Staff on Lin's behalf) was making an effort to improve his own political standing at the expense of other military leaders evidently hostile to him. This was done through gradually increasing praise for Lin in the Liberation Army Daily and through the replacement of some of the commanders and political officers of the military regions and provincial military districts. In the light of these events, it is not surprising that later developments were to suggest the formation of a political alliance between Chou En-lai and a number of military leaders less enthusiastic about the Cultural Revolution than was Lin Piao.

The catalyst was provided by the celebrated Wuhan Incident. Ch'en Tsai-tao, the commander of the Wuhan Military Region, had for some months been using violence against disorderly Red Guards in his bailiwick and had allegedly been favoring anti-Maoist organizations. He was presumably slated for purging sooner or later. Ch'en's later behavior certainly suggests an element of desperation on his part, for when two emissaries came from Peking to work out a settlement of the dispute on terms presumably favorable to the Red Guards, they were soon (on or about July 20) seized and maltreated by the anti-Maoists, with the obvious approval of Ch'en Tsai-tao. The two prisoners were quickly rescued and returned to Peking by local units of the pro-Maoist air force, however, and the political negotiations that made their rescue possible were evidently conducted by Chou En-lai. Partly no doubt for this reason, Chou's stock with the Maoists and his general political influence began to rise, a fact of which he proceeded to take full advantage.

Ch'en Tsai-tao's defiance, for which he was relieved but apparently not criminally punished, focused the wrath of the extreme Maoist leaders in the Cultural Revolution Group, one of whom (Wang Li) had been detained in Wuhan, on the regional and provincial military leadership. There were further purges, and threats of more to come. On August 16, excerpts from the previously unpublished Central Committee statement of August 16, 1959, condemning P'eng Te-huai were published, presumably as a warning to other generals considered to be anti-Maoist.

Shortly afterward, probably in the second half of August, the tide turned; the extreme Maoists had overreached themselves and had precipitated the emergence of an opposing coalition, probably centering on Chou En-lai and the military leadership, with which the extremists could not cope. In short order Chiang Ch'ing became much less conspicuous.

B. ATTEMPT TO RESTORE ORDER

A Central Committee directive of September 5 authorized the army to use force to prevent the theft of its weapons by Red Guards, and by implication to restore order. The Cultural Revolution Group was severely purged, one of the casualties being the vociferous Wang Li. Lin Piao lost his longstanding colleague Hsiao Hua, who disappeared from public view in August. This important shift was explained and defended by Mao himself during an unpublicized tour of certain provinces of North, East, and Central China in late September.

As a result of this authorization, military figures dominate not only the Military Control Commissions but the Revolutionary Committees and Preparatory Committees, in those provinces where these supposedly Maoist bodies have been created. Students have been told to respect the army and been ordered back to school (most schools had been closed in the spring of 1966), under pain of academic expulsion. In some cases, the army has used organizations of workers as a means of controlling the remaining Red Guards, presumably on the theory that even the most fanatical Maoist would

show deference to the theoretical pre-eminence of the working class in the Chinese scene. An effort has been made, apparently with little success, to restore the effectiveness of the party apparatus, although not to rehabilitate those leading members who have been purged. Ploys such as these, accompanied by some use of force, succeeded in improving the state of public order beginning in August and September 1967. Since November there have been further flareups of violence, however, although not on the scale of that which prevailed before August. It appears that if the army wishes to be fully effective in restoring order, it must take stronger measures than those it has taken so far.

Meanwhile, the post-Wuhan central leadership in China appears to consist of a number of groups, each of which bargains with the others without being able to impose its will. In some cases these relationships are undoubtedly acrimonious. On the left is the greatly weakened Cultural Revolution Group, a somewhat chastened and weakened Mao and a still enigmatic Lin Piao. To the center and right are Chou En-lai and his apparently solid following within the bureaucracy, the leading military figures not subservient to Mao and Lin, and whatever is left at the central level (not much, it would seem) of the party apparatus. It is apparently intended, once this fluid and unstable situation is resolved, to hold a Party Congress (the Ninth), but the difficulty that has been experienced in resolving the situation makes it unlikely that the congress can be held in 1968.

C. RED GUARD DIPLOMACY

Until recently at any rate, Mao seems to have regarded the Cultural Revolution as the solution not only to China's problems but to those of the world. Or so at least his more fanatical followers interpreted his beliefs. Even if they were wrong, they must have reasoned, they could do no harm to themselves by demonstrating in their dealings with foreigners their devotion to the Cultural Revolution, and conceivably they might start a Cultural

Revolution among the "revolutionary people" of one or more foreign countries. Mao has probably regarded such activities, together with the Vietnamese crisis, as a helpful and appropriate backdrop for the Cultural Revolution.

In keeping with this line of thinking, Red Guards demonstrated against, besieged, and in one case even sacked foreign missions in Peking during the first eight months of 1967. One of the most important of these incidents was a siege of the Soviet Embassy in late January and early February. Red Guards similarly put pressure on the Foreign Ministry in the late spring, so that it was impossible for Chen Yi and his subordinates to conduct foreign relations in a normal manner. A series of demonstrations by indoctrinated Chinese diplomats and students took place in a number of foreign capitals, notably Rangoon in late June and London in late August. The predictable result was a sharp decline in the CPR's relations with some 30 countries that experienced this type of activity in one form or another. A related phenomenon was the series of Red Guard-style disorders, accompanied by nonmilitary intrusions across the border, that began in Hong Kong in late May. The firm and effective British response to this campaign led to a final galvanic effort on the part of the Red Guards. Under the leadership of the fanatical former chargé d'affaires in Djakarta, Yao Tseng-shan, they seized control of the Foreign Ministry for four days (August 19-23), during which the British Mission compound was sacked.

Earlier in the year, presumably under the pressure of Soviet protests and North Vietnamese representations, the CPR seems to have reached an agreement with Hanoi under which Vietnamese inspectors would accompany Soviet military equipment transiting China en route to Vietnam, so as to ensure against undue delay or tampering. Nevertheless, the chaos of the Cultural Revolution has evidently delayed shipments of both Soviet and Chinese equipment bound for Vietnam, and in this and other ways has decreased Chinese influence in Hanoi. The CPR has nevertheless continued to insist that the "Vietnamese people" must continue to fight a "protracted war,"

preferably at the guerrilla level, and avoid negotiations or compromises that might bring about a settlement short of a proxy victory for the Maoist principle of "people's war."

The CPR followed a basically similar policy toward the Middle Eastern crisis of mid-1967, in whose outbreak it had no hand. Once the crisis had erupted, the CPR opposed all efforts by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations to work out a settlement. Indeed, the CPR detonated its first thermonuclear device and issued a typically bombastic statement on June 17, just as Premier Kosygin was landing at New York, in order to dramatize its opposition to any damping down of the Arabs' struggle against Israel.

The foreign policy of the Cultural Revolution, like its domestic policy, overreached itself. On August 23, perhaps with some military support, Chou En-lai reasserted control of the Foreign Ministry, and a trend back toward normal diplomacy ensured. Apart from the riot in London on August 29, there were no more major antiforeign demonstrations in China or abroad, even after a sizable Sino-Indian shooting incident along the border between Tibet and Sikkim on September 11. Prince Sihanouk received an apology for the Cultural Revolution activities that had occurred in Cambodia; his peculiar importance to Chinese foreign policy resides partly in Cambodia's usefulness as an access route for Chinese supplies destined for the Viet Cong. There has been a slight decline in overt Chinese opposition to the idea of negotiations on Vietnam. No publicity was given to a Chinese nuclear test conducted on December 24, 1967. The CPR has certainly not been the prime mover behind either the Communist lunar New Year offensive in Vietnam in 1968 or the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo by North Korea in late January 1968.

On the other hand, the readjustment of foreign policy since August 1967, while significant, appears less profound than the shift in domestic policy. The CPR apparently continues, for example, to support "people's war" in Burma and Thailand. Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese foreign policy has

been a function of domestic policy to an unprecedented extent, and Mao's opponents have generally elected to take their stand over domestic rather than external issues. It seems likely, therefore, that any proposal for a thoroughgoing review and modification of foreign policy that may have been made even since August 1967, has been suppressed in favor of a continued priority for the debate over domestic political power and policymaking.

V

CHINA'S FUTURE AND US POLICY

It is easier to state what is not likely to happen to Communist China's political system in the future than to state what is likely to happen. It is unlikely that Mao and his close supporters will be able to muster the energy and support for a full-scale renewal of the Cultural Revolution or a repetition of the Great Leap Forward. It is unlikely that Mao has unwittingly paved the way for a military takeover, and that China's unity and development will be assured by the army in a stable and effective fashion. It is also unlikely that the country will fall apart, because the growth of nationalism, the improvement in communications, and the centralization of military production in a few major centers make a return to old-style warlordism seemingly impracticable.

What appears to lie ahead is a confused and possibly prolonged period of transition, during which power and policy will both be in an unstable state, but during which China will become increasingly less Maoist while continuing to proclaim its adherence to Mao's ideals for the sake of unity and continuity. There will be resistance to this trend from the Red Guards and other Maoist fanatics, but this fervor will probably wane with the passage of time. The next stage is likely to come, not with the death of Mao followed by an overt repudiation of him and his policies, but gradually with the emergence of a truly new leadership. This may consist of individuals now unknown to the outside world, who without openly denouncing Mao will evolve some new basis in theory and practice on which policies more attuned to the times and to China's real problems, such as overpopulation, can be developed.

Just as domestic considerations have taken precedence over foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution, so it appears likely

that in the near future the working out of new domestic policies will have priority over a thoroughgoing appraisal and restructuring of foreign policy. The only possible development that might reverse this order of priorities would be a major Far Eastern war, but this contingency does not now appear probable, partly because it would be not in the interest of a transitional Chinese leadership to precipitate it. It seems to follow that, just as the United States can do little to affect Chinese domestic developments and domestic policy, it can do very little to affect Chinese foreign policy. This caveat applies at least to the transitional period before the domestic situation clarifies and stabilizes itself, and before the elite groups and educated public of China arrive at a more reasonable and realistic view of the world and their own place in it.

What, in principle, might United States policy attempt to achieve with respect to China? In the first place, it can try to protect the interests of the United States and its allies against Chinese threats and pressures. To a large extent this has been achieved, and can be achieved in the future, through military containment, with the important qualification that an adequate response to Chinese-supported "people's war" has yet to be found. It is important not to fall victim to an exaggerated view of the Chinese threat, first consciously for policy purposes and then unconsciously; India has gone through both of these two stages in succession. The Chinese threat to Asia is much less an overt military one than one consisting of pressures on other Asian countries--pressures designed simultaneously to bring them to seek accommodation with the CPR in the hope of purchasing exemption from Chinese-supported "people's war" and to promote such wars sooner or later in disregard of the gestures toward accommodation; Burma is an example of a country that has gotten the worst of both these worlds in its dealings with the CPR. There is no necessary reason for believing that the United States and the CPR are on a "collision course," either in the short run over Vietnam or in the long run because of Chinese frustrations and resentments. It is true that for some time the Chinese nuclear

posture will be a vulnerable, first-strike-only, and therefore hair-trigger one. Even in an escalating Sino-American crisis, however, Peking will surely realize that to launch a first strike would be to commit suicide; in addition, for what it is worth, the CPR has frequently declared that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons and has offered to sign a no-first-use agreement with the United States.

Secondly, the United States can attempt to promote change in the CPR, including change in Chinese foreign policy. But how? In view of Peking's insistence on a contrived adversary relationship with the United States, there is no chance at present that direct contacts, official or unofficial, would be effective even if they could be achieved at a level significantly higher than the current modest one. Furthermore, the CPR is as little interested in coming into the United Nations, or other international organizations and negotiations, on conditions acceptable to the rest of the international community as it is in improving its relations with the United States at this stage.

Thirdly, if further protection of Asia (again apart from the case of "people's war") is largely unnecessary, and if induced "mellowing" of Chinese attitudes and policy is largely impossible, the US nevertheless might cast policy with a view toward improving its image and appeal in the eyes of third parties (including critical segments of American public opinion as well as foreign governments and foreign public opinion). This goal may be a worthwhile one. It should be recognized, nevertheless, that steps in such a direction may entail the payment of an ultimately high, even an unacceptable, price. Thus, any "two Chinas" initiative by the United States, in the United Nations for example, would not only be rejected by both Chinas at the present stage but might permanently and completely antagonize both beyond repair. Similarly, any other initiative of a political character that would require Chinese reciprocation in order to be effective not only would inevitably be rejected by the Chinese leadership, given its current state of mind,

but would also run the risk of creating, by the precedent of Chinese rejection, a permanent bar to reciprocation even by a more reasonable leadership in the future.

The only kind of positive gesture by the United States toward the CPR that would seem advisable during China's current political stage of development, then, is one that would be relatively non-controversial and therefore would not inevitably bring a loud public rejection from Peking. There are not many promising initiatives in this category. One might be a quiet abolition of controls on non-strategic trade between the United States and the CPR. As long as such a step was not followed by others of greater political content, it might be considered (except probably in Taipei) as a relatively innocuous step that would bring the United States into line with most other countries but would not significantly ease the CPR's economic situation even if it were reciprocated. It almost certainly would not be reciprocated, but it would quietly leave open an option that a future, more moderate, Communist Chinese leadership could take up.

It may be that sooner or later a future Chinese leadership will decide that the military risks and political strains, although not necessarily the economic costs, of maintaining a state of acute political confrontation with both the two superpowers are excessive. In that case, and in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union has been even more unpopular than the United States in the CPR in recent years, there is at least a good chance that a pragmatic reconciliation with the Soviet Union will be attempted first and that the adversary relationship with the United States will continue. Willingly or not, the CPR has to accept the Soviet Union as an Asian power, if only because the Soviet Union occupies a huge mass of Asian territory from which it is most unlikely to be evicted. Furthermore, before Mao's decision to treat the Soviet Union as an adversary, Sino-Soviet relations were viable, although not always friendly. The United States, on the other hand, is probably regarded by most Chinese leaders as a power that has no business in

Asia--an attitude that prevails irrespective of whether or not a particular Chinese leader would hope to capitalize actively on any vacuum created by an American withdrawal from Asia. In any case, it would be short-sighted of the United States to base policy on a supposed impossibility of some form of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, or on a supposed inevitability of some sort of Sino-American rapprochement.

As has been suggested, unless and until there emerge clear signs of a changed spirit in Peking, the United States should exercise considerable caution in launching political initiatives toward the CPR. Reasonable and legitimate Chinese needs for unity, development, security, and even influence must be conceded and recognized, but these do not include Chinese claims to an exclusive and dominant sphere of influence in Asia. Perhaps the best slogan for future American policy would be the one recently coined by Professor Richard Solomon of the University of Michigan: persistence without provocation.

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13. ABSTRACT This Paper presents an analysis (necessarily tentative) of the Cultural Revolution, with emphasis on policymaking and the power struggle at the top of the political system. After a brief histori- cal introduction (1958-1964), the Paper analyzes the internal crisis that emerged in Communist China in 1965; the Maoist offensive of 1966, marked by the launching of the Cultural Revolution; and the breakdown of the Cultural Revolution that began in 1967. The Paper concludes with an estimate of the future course of Chinese policy, and suggests appropriate guidelines for US policy toward China.		

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